This Trump transformation of America was intended to be rebuilt as America First.
The story, both on Ukraine and Iran, is that President Trump wants a ‘deal’ – and both deals are available – yet he seems nonetheless to have boxed himself in. Trump presents his Administration as being something rougher, meaner, and far less sentimental. It aspires to emerge, apparently, as also something more centralized, coercive, and radical.
In domestic policy, there may be some truth to this categorisation of the Trumpian ethos. In foreign policy, however, Trump tergiversates. The reason is not clear, but the fact of it clouds his prospects in the three areas vital to his ‘peace-maker’ aspiration – Ukraine, Iran and Gaza.
Whilst it is true that Trump’s true mandate derived from rampant economic and social discontent, rather than from his claims to be a peacemaker – yet the two key foreign policy ends remain important to maintaining momentum forward.
One possible answer is that in foreign negotiations, the President needs a grounded and experienced team to support him. And he does not have that.
In advance of sending his Envoy Witkoff to talk to President Putin, General Kellogg, it seems, presented Trump with a Versailles-type Armistice proposal: A vision of Russia on the ropes (i.e. the plan was cast in terms more appropriate to Russian capitulation). Kellogg’s proposal implied also that Trump would be doing Putin a ‘big favour’ – by condescending to offer him a ladder down which to climb from his perch up the Ukraine ‘tree’. And this was exactly the line Trump took in January:
Having stated that Russia had lost one million men (in the war), Trump then went on to say that “Putin is destroying Russia by not making a deal”. He further claimed that Russia’s economy was in ‘ruins’, and most notably, said that he would consider sanctioning or tariffing Russia. In a subsequent Truth Social post, he wrote, “I’m going to do Russia – whose Economy is failing – and President Putin, a very big FAVOR”.
The President – duly briefed by his team – may have imagined that he would offer Putin a unilateral ceasefire and, hey presto, would have a quick deal to his credit.
All the premises on which the Kellogg plan was based (Russia’s vulnerability to sanctions, huge losses of men, and a stalemated war) were false. Did no one on Trump’s team then do any due diligence on the Kellogg strategy? It seems (lazily) to have taken the Korean war as its template, without due consideration of whether it be appropriate, or not.
In the Korean instance, the ceasefire along a Conflict Line preceded political considerations, which came only later. And which remain ongoing – and unresolved – until today.
By launching premature demands for an immediate ceasefire during talks with Russian officials in Riyadh, Trump invited rejection. Firstly, because the Trump Team had no concrete plan for how to implement a ceasefire, simply presuming rather that all such details could be settled post-hoc. In short, it was presented to Trump as a ‘quick win’.
Only it wasn’t.
The outcome was fore-ordained – the ceasefire was declined. It should not have been allowed to happen, given competent staff work. Had none of Trump’s team been listening since 14 June of last year when Putin very clearly outlined MFA the Russian position on a ceasefire? And which has been repeated regularly ever since. Apparently not.
Yet even so, when Trump’s Envoy, Witkoff, returned from a long meeting with President Putin to report on the latter’s personal, detailed explanation of why a political framework must precede any ceasefire (unlike Korea), Witkoff’s account reportedly was met with the flat retort that ‘the Ukrainians would never agree’ from General Kellogg.
End of discussion, apparently. No decision taken.
Several more flights to Moscow have not altered the basic situation. Moscow awaits evidence that Trump is able to consolidate his position and can take charge of the situation. But until then, Moscow stands ready to facilitate a ‘rapprochement of positionality’ – but will not approve a unilateral ceasefire. (And nor will Zelensky).
The puzzle here is why Trump doesn’t cut off U.S. weapons and intelligence flows to Kiev, and tell the Europeans to butt out of Trump’s way? Does Kiev have some form of veto power? Does Team Trump not understand that the Europeans simply hope to disrupt Trump’s aim to normalise relations with Russia? They must do.
It seems that the “debate” (if you can call it that) in the Trump Team largely excluded real life factors. It took place at some high normative level, where certain facts and truths are simply assumed.
Maybe the Sunk Costs phenomenon weighed heavily – the longer you continue with a course of action (no matter how stupid), the less willing you are to change it. Changing it would be interpreted as acknowledging error – and acknowledging error is the first stage to losing power.
And there is a parallel with the talks with Iran.
Trump has a vision for a negotiated settlement with Iran that would achieve his objective of ‘no Iranian nuclear weapon’ – though the aim itself, is something of a tautology given that the U.S. intelligence community already has determined that Iran has NO nuclear weapon.
How do you stop something that is not occurring? Well, ‘intent’ is an enormously difficult concept to ring-fence. So, the Team heads back to basics: to the original Rand Organisation’s firm doctrine that there exists no qualitative difference between peaceful and weapon-linked enrichment of uranium. So, no enrichment should be permitted.
Only Iran does have enrichment – thanks to the Obama concession as part of the JCPOA, which allowed it, subject to limitations.
Many ideas are floating around about how to square this circle – of Iran’s refusal to relinquish enrichment versus Trump’s ‘no capacity’ to weaponise dictum. None of the ideas is new: Importing into Iran enriched feedstock; exporting Iran’s highly enriched uranium to Russia (something already done as part of the JCPOA), and having Russia build Iran’s nuclear energy capacity to power its industry. The problem is that Russia is already doing that too. It has one plant already up, and another in construction.
Israel naturally has its own proposals too: Root out all Iranian enrichment infrastructure and missile delivery capacity.
Only Iran will never agree to this.
So, the choice is either a jacked-up inspection and technical surveillance system in a JCPOA-like accord (which will not make either Israel or the pro-Israel Institutional leadership happy). Or military action.
Which takes us back to the Trump Team and the internecine divisions within the Pentagon.
Pete Hegseth sent the following message to Iran, posted on his social media account:
“We see your LETHAL support to The Houthis. We know exactly what you are doing. You know very well what the U.S. Military is capable of – and you were warned. You will pay the CONSEQUENCE at the time and place of our choosing”.
Plainly, Hegseth is frustrated. As Larry Johnson has noted:
“The Trump team has been labouring under [another] false assumption that the Biden folks did not make a serious effort to destroy the Houthis’ arsenal of missiles and drones. The Trumpers believed that they could bomb the Houthis into submission. Instead, the U.S. is demonstrating to all countries in the region the limits of its naval and air power … Despite more than 600 bombing sorties, the Houthis continue to launch missiles and drones at U.S. ships in the Red Sea and targets inside Israel”.
So, Team Trump has waded firstly into one conflict (Yemen), and secondly, into a complex negotiation with Iran, again seemingly without doing its homework on Yemen. Is this down to group think again:
“In a situation of uncertainty like the present, solidarity comes to be seen as an end in itself, and nobody wants to be accused of ‘weakening the West’ or ‘strengthening Iran’. If you have to be wrong, best be wrong in the company of as many others as possible”.
Will Israel let this pass? It is beavering away with General Kurilla (the U.S. General in command at CENTCOM) in the bunker under the Israeli Defence Department – preparing plans for a joint attack on Iran. Israel appears very keen on his work.
Yet, the fundamental impediment to achieving an accord with Iran is more crucial – in that, as presently construed, the U.S. approach to the negotiations breaks all the rules about how to initiate a weapons-limitation treaty.
On the one hand, there is Israel with a triad of nuclear weapons systems and delivery capacities: from submarines, aircraft and by missile. Israel has also threatened the use of nuclear weapons – recently in Gaza and earlier during the first Iraq war, in response to Saddam Hussein’s Scud missile capacity.
The missing principle here is any modicum of reciprocity. Iran is said to threaten Israel – and Israel regularly threatens Iran. And Israel, of course, wants Iran neutered and disarmed and insists itself be untouched (no NPT, no IAEA inspections, no acknowledgment).
The arms-limitation treaties initiated by JF Kennedy with Khruschev derived from the successful reciprocal negotiation by which the U.S. withdrew its missiles from Turkey before Russia removed its own missiles from Cuba.
It must be clear to Trump and Witkoff that such a lopsided proposal as theirs for Iran bears no relation to geo-political realities – and is therefore likely to fail (sooner or later). Team Trump thus, is cornering itself into military action against Iran – which they will then own.
Trump does not want that; Iran does not want that. So, has this been adequately thought through? Has the Yemen experience been taken fully into account? Has the Trump Team mooted some off-ramp?
One creative way out of the dilemma – and which might restore at least some semblance to a classical arms limitation treaty exercise – would be for Trump to air the notion that now is time for Israel to enter the NPT and to have its weapons inspected by the IAEA.
Will Trump do that? No.
It then becomes obvious why.
This Trump transformation of America was intended to be rebuilt as America First.
Alastair Crooke: Former British diplomat, founder and director of the Beirut-based Conflicts Forum.
Source: Strategic Culture Foundation
Photo: France’s President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer with US President Donald Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Basilica, Vatican on the sidelines of funeral for Pope Francis. Photo Credit: Ukrainian Presidential Press Service
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